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UNITED NATIONS AND NGO UPDATES
united nationS
gender eQuality in education 
and tHe MillenniuM developMent 
goalS in uganda
On September 24 2010, Ugandan 
President Yoweri Museveni boldly pro-
claimed to the UN Generally Assembly 
that Uganda “will definitely” achieve the 
Millennium Development Goal 3 on gen-
der equality and empowering women by 
promoting education at all levels no later 
than 2015. The Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) are a series of eight non-
binding commitments to cut world pov-
erty in half, agreed to unanimously by 
UN Member States in December 2000. 
To address the progress of these goals, 
the UN Development Programme (UNDP) 
prepared an assessment entitled “What 
Will it Take to Achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals?” in advance of this 
year’s UN summit in New York. The report 
revealed that countries that succeeded in 
achieving MDG 3 saw a multiplier effect 
in reaching the other seven MDGs. To that 
end, Uganda has taken steps towards codi-
fying a national policy on gender equality 
and advancing human rights by drawing up 
a legal framework for their development. 
Yet, advancement of gender equality in 
education and empowering women remain 
unmet goals despite these legal laws and 
President Museveni’s optimism.
Currently, only one-third of girls who 
enroll in primary education in Uganda are 
still in school at the age of 18, compared to 
one-half of boys. Early pregnancies, sexual 
harassment, lack of sanitation facilities, 
and female genital mutilation cause many 
girls to drop out or miss school. The coun-
try’s failure to adequately address women’s 
issues has hindered economic development 
as well. According to Uganda’s develop-
ment plan, ending gender inequality in 
education and formal sector employment 
would increase the GDP by 1.2 percent 
annually.
The actual conditions of female 
Ugandan students are in stark contrast to the 
words of the Ugandan Constitution, which 
accords men and women equal dignity 
under the law. Because this language alone 
proved insufficient, Uganda took action in 
2005, amending the Constitution to call 
for the creation of the Equal Opportunities 
Commission (EOC) to correct imbalances 
for women and historically underrepre-
sented groups. The new Constitution pres-
ents the EOC with the daunting task of 
“[taking] affirmative action in favor of 
groups marginalized on the basis of gen-
der, age, disability or any other reason cre-
ated by history, tradition or custom, for the 
purpose of redressing imbalances which 
exist against them.” The Constitution left 
it to Parliament to determine the specific 
powers and form of the EOC. Thus, when 
Parliament passed the Equal Opportunities 
Commission Act of 2007, it granted the 
EOC the power not just to issue recom-
mendations, but also “to order any institu-
tion, body, authority or person to adopt or 
take particular steps or action which, in the 
opinion of the Commission will promote 
equal opportunities . . . .”
In Uganda, the government’s unwill-
ingness to move beyond written words to 
achieve MDG 3 has perpetuated gender 
inequality. Uganda has failed to adequately 
address women’s education, but has in the 
EOC an incredibly powerful tool to imple-
ment change. The EOC is vested with the 
power to curtail the conditions that lead to 
a higher female dropout rate in schools. It 
can address sexual harassment in schools 
by imposing civil sanctions on the per-
petrators and by requiring schools to end 
harassment or else face funding cuts. It 
could legally require that primary and sec-
ondary level curriculums change to include 
lessons on avoiding pregnancy at a young 
age and also that schools provide educa-
tion to pregnant women and girls. The 
EOC also has the power to move female 
genital mutilation trials to the top of court 
dockets and mandate harsh sentences for 
those found guilty. Unfortunately, in spite 
of its potential to enact positive change, the 
EOC was not staffed until August 2009 and 
has not yet been able to make a significant 
impact in achieving its constitutional man-
date or furthering Uganda’s MDG commit-
ments.
If the EOC can fully employ its author-
ity to mandate gender equality in educa-
tion, Uganda may have the potential to 
reach MDG 3 and thus further the other 
poverty reduction goals. The Ugandan 
leadership has acknowledged the signifi-
cance of achieving MDG 3 and invested in 
legal mechanisms to help advance gender 
equality. However, the EOC’s slow prog-
ress and the significant gaps in gender edu-
cation in Uganda make achieving MDG 3 a 
daunting task. With such strong moral and 
economic incentives, Uganda will need to 
move beyond words and employ all of its 
available tools to ensure gender equality in 
education.
MiSSed opportunitieS in Haiti: 
a peaceKeeping MiSSion SparKS 
proteSt
Amidst considerable protest, the UN 
Security Council voted unanimously to 
extend the mandate of the UN peace-
keeping force in Haiti, Mission des 
Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en 
Haïti (MINUSTAH), on October 14, 2010. 
Under UN Resolution 1944, the mission 
will remain active until October 15, 2011 
to assist with security during the November 
2010 elections and ensure post-election 
stability. Yet, Haitians have called for the 
UN to recall its troops in the wake of ongo-
ing allegations of human rights abuses and 
lack of accountability. Displaced Haitians 
have also expressed anger at MINUSTAH 
troops for their failure to protect residents 
of temporary camps, alleging that sol-
diers have stood by while violence and 
gender-based abuse occurs. MINUSTAH 
has proven to be a problematic mission 
from the start, and these accusations are 
only the most recent in a long list of human 
rights abuses soldiers have been accused of 
committing or condoning. The UN should 
proactively address these accusations by 
providing transparency and accountability, 
or else it will risk further harming those it 
aims to protect.
On April 30, 2004, in response to a 
deteriorating political and humanitarian 
situation in Haiti, UN Resolution 1542 
authorized MINUSTAH. MINUSTAH 
was to promote and protect human rights, 
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particularly those of women and chil-
dren, and to assist NGOs and the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights with investigations into violations 
of human rights and humanitarian law. 
Yet complaints that MINUSTAH troops 
were themselves committing such abuses 
began almost immediately after the mis-
sion began, and Haitians have alleged that 
the troops are not held accountable for 
violations of fundamental rights. The UN’s 
failure to prevent MINUSTAH troops from 
committing human rights violations and to 
hold perpetrators accountable has seriously 
undermined its credibility in Haiti.
Haitian students and rights organizations 
argue that it is time for the soldiers to leave. 
Despite Security Council approval, oppo-
nents of the UN mission claim that it under-
mines Haiti’s sovereignty guaranteed in the 
UN Charter, and that the continued presence 
of over 8,000 peacekeepers amounts to an 
illegal occupation. Human Rights Watch 
and Harvard Law Student Advocates for 
Human Rights have also alleged specific 
human rights violations including unlawful 
arrests, denial of fair and public hearing, 
and failure to provide remedies.
Contributing to the frustration, Haitians 
have encountered many obstacles to hold-
ing UN peacekeepers legally account-
able. In theory, they have three legal ave-
nues: legal action in Haiti; legal action in 
Brazil, the largest provider of troops to 
MINUSTAH; or a petition to the Inter-
American Commission for Human Rights 
(IACHR). It is extremely difficult to 
bring suit in Haiti, as the Status of Forces 
Agreement governing MINUSTAH and 
agreed upon by the UN and the Haitian 
government, only allows for a civil action 
to proceed in Haiti with the mission com-
mander’s approval, a prospect deemed by 
the UN Human Rights Council to be a 
virtual impossibility. Criminal trials are 
equally unlikely because the UN would be 
required to hand over Brazilian soldiers, 
an action Brazil is unlikely to accept. 
While the Brazilian civil code allows for-
eigners to sue in domestic courts for acts 
perpetrated by Brazilian citizens abroad, 
the costs and difficulty of bringing a case 
in a foreign jurisdiction are prohibitive. 
Brazil is also unlikely to bring criminal 
charges against its own soldiers on behalf 
of Haitian victims.
While the IACHR is ostensibly an 
option for those seeking redress, the 
IACHR requires a petitioner to exhaust 
all domestic remedies before hearing a 
case. In Jimmy Charles v. Haiti before 
the IACHR, petitioners argued that a 
civil action in Haitian courts for damages 
against Brazil was futile because of the 
state of the Haitian justice system. The 
petitioners further argued that the Charles 
family could not be reasonably expected 
to file suit in Brazil due to the high costs 
and low probability of success. In spite of 
these arguments, the IACHR held that the 
plaintiffs had not exhausted all domestic 
remedies and refused to hear the case.
The lack of accountability for those 
within MINUSTAH is cause for great 
concern. So far, the UN has missed the 
opportunity to fulfill its human right man-
date. Continuing to ignore allegations of 
abuse and impunity runs the risk of insti-
gating further hostility against the mission. 
Among possible remedies, the commander 
of the mission could allow Haitians to 
bring civil claims against soldiers in their 
home countries in cases of human rights 
violations, or the IACHR could decide that 
the obstacles to effective domestic rem-
edies are so great as to justify waiving this 
requirement as futile. However, inaction 
denies Haitians their fundamental right 
to a remedy as guaranteed by the UDHR 
and undermines the purpose of the UN 
mission.
Thomas Avery, a J.D. Candidate at the American 
University Washington College of Law, covers 
the United Nations for the Human Rights Brief.
MillenniuM developMent goalS 
and tHe role oF non-State actorS
On February 5, 2010, the UN General 
Assembly (GA) proposed and implemented 
GA Resolution 64/184, inviting non-state 
actors to the UN summit process. The 
Resolution called for an informal hearing 
with non-state entities to develop recom-
mendations for the 2010 UN Summit on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
The UN held the hearings on June 14-15, 
2010. Non-state actors are rarely heard 
at such high-level meetings despite their 
significant influence on domestic imple-
mentation of international law. Thus, these 
unprecedented hearings reveal an emerg-
ing paradox: despite the increasing power 
of non-state entities on the formulation, 
implementation, and enforcement of inter-
national legal norms, these actors have no 
legal personality under international law.
A lack of formal engagement with 
non-state actors has often sidelined rec-
ognition of the contributions of non-state 
entities; however, the UN’s inclusion of 
these parties may signal an emerging pol-
icy shift. The civil society organizations 
that attended the UN hearings stressed the 
need for a holistic approach to the MDGs 
and called for increased accountability 
for states as key to meeting these goals. 
Non-state actors also emphasized that the 
lack of legal standing for civil society 
fact-finders can make the call for account-
ability an arduous or impossible task. Amid 
considerable criticism, a final outcome 
document was released in early September. 
Pointedly, non-state participants expressed 
disappointment about the document’s fail-
ure to fully integrate their suggestions. 
Despite the positive indications of a policy 
shift, the outcome of the UN hearings was 
not as powerful a change as GA Resolution 
64/184 initially suggested. Thus, the real-
ity remains that, although civil society is 
gradually allowed more influence over 
international legal norms, it still has no 
legal status or personality under interna-
tional law.
Nonetheless, non-state actors play a crit-
ical role in international law-making, adju-
dication, and enforcement. Furthermore, 
they are essential to the process of estab-
lishing state violations of international 
obligations, both through fact finding and 
information dissemination. Lack of legal 
personality undermines these contribu-
tions, often limiting the ability of non-state 
actors to address violations of fundamental 
rights and obligations. The formal incorpo-
ration of non-state actors into UN hearings 
and summits may alter this framework by 
allowing them to influence the creation 
of customary law and coordinated state 
action. These hearings and the resulting 
document exemplify the challenges non-
state actors pose to the current understand-
ing of international law by encouraging 
increased accountability and transparency. 
Although non-state actors expressed disap-
pointment in the outcome, these hearings 
represent a first step in the UN’s difficult 
task of formally engaging NGOs, civil 
society, and business.
International law deals primarily with 
states, so engaging non-state actors in the 
creation of customary international norms 
can be problematic. Non-state actors with 
no legal standing also have no formal legal 
powers against states that fall short in 
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meeting international obligations. Article 
38 of the International Court of Justice 
Statute lists customary international law 
as a primary source of international law, 
which “consists of rules of law derived 
from the consistent conduct of States act-
ing out of the belief that the law required 
them to act that way.” This historical focus 
on states as the subject of international 
law is therefore enshrined in customary 
international law. As states are the sole 
parties that affect the creation of custom-
ary international law, they also control 
the legal instruments used to ensure com-
pliance with international human rights 
law. Furthermore, international treaties are 
agreements between states, to which only 
states can be signatories, adding to the 
normative exclusion of non-state actors 
in the formulation of international law. 
Thus, non-state actors are severely limited 
in their ability to create mechanisms to 
hold states accountable for violations of 
international human rights law, not meet-
ing treaty obligations, and non-compliance 
with universal goals.
The GA resolution inviting participa-
tion by non-state actors, the pre-summit 
hearings, and the roundtable presence at the 
summit all demonstrate a desire to increase 
non-state actor participation in formal inter-
national dialogue. When the UN recognized 
non-state actors in the planning phases of 
the MDG Summit, it was an initial step 
in creating a formal role for, and holding 
states accountable to, non-state actors in the 
international arena. This type of recognition 
may also alter the development of custom-
ary laws by allowing non-state actors to 
influence their evolution. Where lack of 
legal recognition has often led to the mar-
ginalization of non-state entities, the UN’s 
decision to engage them on a formal level 
may indicate a change in policy.
tHe un peaceKeeping MiSSion in 
tHe drc MaKeS unSucceSSFul 
atteMpt at FurtHering tHe 
reSponSibility to protect
Between July 30 and August 2, 2010, at 
least 303 women, men, and children were 
raped in the North Kivu Province of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
The rapes occurred less than thirty kilome-
ters east of the UN peacekeeping mission’s 
operating base. After the rapes were publi-
cized, the UN issued a statement admitting 
its own failure to prevent mass rapes and 
urging the DRC to do more to protect citi-
zens. The UN mission’s failure in the DRC 
may be the result of inadequate resources 
and constraints imposed by its limited 
mandate. This incident demonstrates that 
the UN needs to reform traditional peace-
keeping approaches in order to better meet 
its international responsibilities.
Civilian protection has become espe-
cially important to the UN in the past five 
years as the responsibility to protect (R2P) 
has emerged as an articulated consider-
ation of states. R2P places pressure on 
states to protect their citizens and accept 
the aid of other states when they are unable 
to do so themselves, as well as to recognize 
the possibility of international interven-
tion when state action is not sufficient to 
protect a population from mass atrocities. 
Specifically, R2P is directed at protecting 
against genocide, crimes against human-
ity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. The 
responsibility extends to protecting the 
population against mass rape, categorized 
as a crime against humanity in interna-
tional law. The UN has been instrumental 
in helping to promote R2P under the 
auspices of the UN Charter obligation to 
promote international peace and security 
through peacekeeping missions and assert-
ing pressure on states; sadly, its own per-
formance on R2P has been imperfect.
The recent failure of both the UN and the 
DRC to prevent mass rapes in North Kivu 
illustrates the need for R2P to be jointly 
assumed and more effectively enforced. In 
June 2010, the Security Council approved a 
new peacekeeping mission, United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO). MONUSCO was deployed 
with the consent of the DRC government 
and charged to help ensure effective pro-
tection of civilians. The DRC’s willingness 
to allow MONUSCO to engage within 
its borders demonstrated compliance with 
the R2P principle “to seek assistance to 
protect the population.” Unfortunately, the 
atrocities in North Kivu exemplify a dis-
connection between the positive intentions 
of the UN and the DRC government and 
the reality on the ground. Lack of fund-
ing has exacerbated communication dif-
ficulties and cultural differences, which 
in turn has forestalled effective and timely 
intervention to prevent attacks on civilian 
populations. Furthermore, MONUSCO’s 
is constrained from ensuring appropriate 
protection of civilians by the limited num-
ber of troops.
The rise of R2P demonstrates a grow-
ing trend in the international commu-
nity to challenge state sovereignty in the 
face of potential crimes against humanity. 
Traditionally, international law emphasizes 
state sovereignty, but R2P allows external 
powers to inquire into human rights viola-
tions and “assist” states on behalf of vul-
nerable populations within their borders. 
The basis for this extraterritorial obligation 
to protect arises out of increased account-
ability in international law and progres-
sive theories of universal jurisdiction. The 
UN Charter calls for the promotion and 
respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the human rights and fun-
damental freedoms memorialized in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
are recognized as customary international 
law. Yet, these texts are vague and difficult 
to enforce, making it rare for states to 
be held accountable for all but the worst 
transgressions. Therefore, even though the 
DRC allows UN peacekeepers to assist, 
MONUSCO is limited by the government 
in the actions it is permitted to take to pro-
tect the population.
In light of the limitations of exist-
ing human rights mechanisms, there are 
numerous legal challenges to overcome 
in asserting the R2P. State sovereignty 
continues to pose a significant obstacle to 
the R2P because of its status as a pillar of 
international law. Even in circumstances 
where a state is willing to accept help from 
the international community, the assistance 
can be ineffective and untimely, as was the 
case of the peacekeeping mission in the 
DRC. Nonetheless, recent customary inter-
national law is permissive of international 
actions against large-scale and continuous 
violations of human rights. This movement 
to protect people from mass atrocities is 
just beginning and much still needs to be 
done to ensure that any proffered assis-
tance has the effect of adequately protect-
ing a state’s population. A first step would 
be to strengthen the mandate and funding 
of UN peacekeeping missions to ensure 
that peacekeepers can help to fulfill the 
responsibility to protect.
Sikina S. Hasham, an LL.M. Candidate at the 
American University Washington College of Law 
also covers the United Nations for the Human 
Rights Brief. HRB
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